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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
VOID FOR VAGUENESS: AN ESCAPE FROM
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In the recent case of Winters v. New York, the Supreme
Court of the United States held invalid a New York statute
which regulated the sale of publications "principally made up
of criminal news . . . or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust
or crime."' 2 The New York Court of Appeals had limited this
broad language to forbid the dissemination of publications in
which accounts of lust and crime were "so massed as to be-
come vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against
the person."3 Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, found
the standard prohibiting publication too uncertain and in-
definite to give adequate notice to distributors acting under
it. Accordingly, the challenged section of the statute was
invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment. In its vague-
ness, it violated procedural due process and the rights of free
speech and press.4
1. 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).
2. N. Y. Penal Law §1141(2).
3. People v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 645, 550, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1945).
4. The Court's opinion is difficult to place squarely on a particular
constitutional ground. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in dissenting,
treats the majority opinion as invalidating the statute for indef-
initeness because it falls "within the prohibitions of the 'vague
contours' of the Due Process Clause." Winters v. New York, 68
S.Ct. 665, 674 (1948). However, the gist of Mr. Justice Reed's opin-
ion and the cases he relies on seem to indicate that the fault of the
statute's vagueness was its possible application to activities pro-
tected by the guarantees of free speech and press. Winters v. New
York, supra at 671. Two questions arise from this interpretation:
(1) Does the dictum, p. 671, distinguishing the Court's attitude
as to statutes "not entwined with limitations on free ex-
pression" with statutes so entwined, indicate an intention
by the Court to indulge in a distinction as to vague statutes
like the distinction enunciated by the Court in the Carolene
Case? See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 n.4 (1938); Wechsler, "Stone and the Constitu-
tion," 46 Col. L. Rev. 764, 793 et seq. (1946).
(2) Does a constitutional requirement analogous to "standing to
sue" limit the effect of this opinion? In order to raise a ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a provision, the challenger
must be of a class against whom the provision would work
a denial of due process. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152(1907). Cf. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399
(1930). In the instant case, defendant raised the question
of vagueness in the context of a First Amendment argu-
ment. The issue of "standing to sue" was not discussed.
How material to his case was the presence of the free
(272)
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The frequency with which the doctrine of "void for
vagueness" has been raised by parties and discussed either
by the Supreme Court or by individual justices in recent
years warrants re-examination of the subject, particularly
since many of the best contributions 6 to the copious literature
in the field are now old.
If any one formulation of the rule against indefiniteness
can be given, it is that a man of average intelligence should
be able to determine beforehand what conduct is prohibited.7
When faced with the problem of ruling on the applicability
of an allegedly vague statute a court might: refuse to apply
the statute to the instant case ;8 "construe" the statute so as
to give it sufficient meaning and then apply or refuse to
apply ito (compare the instant case in the state court) ; de-
clare the statute void for that case and all others (compare
the instant case in the United States Supreme Court).
speech and press element, i.e., could a defendant challenge
the statute solely on the ground of vagueness? See 29
Calif. L. Rev. 548 at 551 (1941) where this question is
posed and illustrated by the following situation: a statute
prohibiting driving a car "at an excessive speed" could
clearly be attacked as too vague by a defendant prosecutedfor driving 35 miles per hour in a residential zone. Query:
could a defendant who drove through the same zone at 80
miles per hour successfully raise the same issue of vague-
ness?5. E.g., Black, J., dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.226, 261 (1945); Rutiedge, t., concurring in Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 113 (1945) ; Rutledge, J., dissenting in Robin-
son v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945).
6. Aigler, "Legislation Vague or General Terms," 21 Mich. L.
Rev. 831 (1922) is the best article in the field. The best student
note is in 45 Harv. L. Rev. 160 (1931). For competent recent
treatment, see 26 Tex. L. Rev. 216 (1947); 33 Va. L. Rev. 203(1947).
7. The jurisprudential foundation from which this rule would seem
to spring is the basic principle nulla poenu sine lege, i.e., no man
should be punished unless there is a law to cover his offense. See
Hall, "General Principles of Criminal Law" 19 (1947).
8. See State v. Parker, 183 Minn. 588, 237 N.W. 409 (1931) where the
court reversed a conviction under a statute which prohibited the
erection of a building on a lot so that there would be a dwelling
at the rear of another building on the same lot. The court said
that the use of the word "lot" made the description of the offense
sought to be created too indefinite and uncertain.
9. This approach leads into the field of statutory construction and its
"rules" of procedure. The primary consideration in this field is
the doctrine of strict construction: penal laws are "strictly con-
strued in favor of the accused," and statutes "in derogation of the
common law" are "strictly construed." It has been suggested that
no rule of construction ever determined the decision of a court, but
at most helped frame the issues. See Horack, "Constitutional
Liberties and Statutory Construction," 29 Iowa L. Rev. 448 at 453
(1944).
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Prior to the nineteenth century "void for vagueness" was
probably never used.1° Indeed, in England the absence of a
doctrine of judicial supremacy would make it difficult for a
court explicitly to invalidate the product of the legislative
branch. Instead, British courts resorted to canons of con-
struction to give "content" to vague statutes. These canons
ranged from "construing the statute strictly" to "avoiding
interpretations which would produce collaterally absurd or
mischievous results."" Obviously, prolonged application of a
canon of construction could circumvent the will of the legis-
lature just as surely as would an articulate declaration that
the statute was "void for vagueness." The result therefore,
would be the same as that reached in the Winters case by a
single decision. But the technique was, in a sense, more
subtle. For example, the court would "strictly construe" a
statute requiring that notice of a certain offense be pro-
claimed "in two market towns near the place where the of-
fense was committed" to mean "those towns nearest the place
of commission of the crime." 12 Since notice was not so given,
defendant was released because not legally convicted. On the
other hand, a court would, by an "interpretation" of an
amendment to a statute, uphold the conviction of the defend-
ant thereunder, because the court found the intention of the
legislature was to include acts such as defendant's, although
the amendment taken literally was close to gibberish.'1
Nor is there any record of the application of "void for
vagueness" in Colonial practice in the seventeenth and eight-
10. Writers in the field seem to be in somd conflict as to whether: (1)
English courts believed they at least had the power to invalidate
acts of Parliament, (2) English courts actually did invalidate acts
of Parliament. See Plucknett, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Re-
view," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1926); Pound, "Common Law and
Legislation," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908); Radin, "Early Statutory
Interpretation in England," 38 Ill. L. Rev. 16 (1943); Von Mehren,
"The Judicial Conception of Legislation in Tudor England," in
"Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies" 751 (Sayre ed.
1947).
11. 1 Bl. Comm. 91.
12. Rex v. Harvey, 1 Wils. K.B. 164, 95 Eng. Rep. 551 (1747). Cf.
Lloyd v. Rosbee, 2 Camp. 453, 170 Eng. Rep. 1216 (1810).
13. The King v. Vasey, 2 K.B. 748 (1905). The court cited Maxwell's
"Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies" 751 (Sayre ed.language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity,
hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may
be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even
the structure of the sentence." Id. at 750.
[Vol. 23
eenth centuries. The Privy Council appears never to have
resorted to the "vagueness" reasoning, although it invalidated
Colonial legislation for other reasons.1' Neither The Fed-
eralist nor the records of debates of the Constitutional Con-
vention and the ratifying conventions indicate that the con-
cept was considered a serious issue, if an issue at all.15
The doctrine, as an explicit technique, seems to be in-
digenous to the United States. Its genesis lies in scattered
cases which arose before the Civil War. Two early federal
cases referred to vagueness by way of dictum. The Enter-
ptrse'6 concerned an appeal from condemnation of a ship and
its cargo under a statute17 which denied clearance to a ves-
sel unless laden under inspection. The statute made the
clearance subject to the same restrictions and penalties
(among which was condemnation) "as are provided by law
for the inspection of merchandise imported into the United
States. ... " Mr. Justice Livingston found it impossible to
tell whether it was meant to punish the act of loading secretly
by any other sanction than denial of clearance. Hence the
court could not persuade itself that there was ground for
forfeiture."8 In United States v. Sharp0 a statute made it
a misdemeanor to "make a revolt in the ship. ' 20  Circuit
Judge Washington said that although he had a fair idea in his
own mind of what was meant, yet he was "not able to sup-
port it [the statute], by any authority to be met with, either
14. E.g., a Connecticut statute was held void, on appeal, by the Privy
Council "... as being contrary to the law of this realm, unreason-
able, and against the tenor of their charter." Winthrop v. Lech-
mere (1727), see 1 Thayer, "Cases on Constitutional Law" 136
(1895); Haines, "The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy"
c.3 (2d ed. 1932).
15. However the provisions against ex post facto laws (U.S. Const.
Art. I, §9(3) and §10(1) indicate concern as to the juris-
prudential aspects. Cf. Crosskey, "The True Meaning of the
Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws," 14 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 539 (1947) where the argument i4 made that the clauses
were intended to cover civil as well as criminal laws.
16. 8 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 4, 499 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810).
17. 2 Stat. 499 (1808).
18. There seems to be some disagreement as to whether the case rests
upon the doctrine of strict construction or whether it illustrates
the doctrine of "void for vagueness." See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 160
and n.2 (1931). Cf. Horack, "Cases on Legislation" 780 and n.1
(1940). It is believed that close reading will show that its does
fit the latter category although some federal cases cite it for the
strict construction rule.
19. 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, No. 16,264 (C.C.D.Pa. 1815).
20. 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
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in the common, admiralty, or civil law. If we resort to defini-
tions given by philologists, they are so multifarious
that I cannot avoid feeling a natural repugnance, to selecting
from this mass of definition, one, which may fix a crime upon
these men, and that too of a capital nature; when, by making
a different selection, it would be no crime at all.. .- 21
Partly for these reasons judgment was arrested and the in-
dictmeift under the statute quashed.
The earliest state case discovered which mentioned vague-
ness was a North Carolina case of 1833, where the court was
faced with the construction of a private law. In dictum the
court said that "Whether a statute be a public or a private
one, if the terms in which it is couched be so vague as to
convey no definite meaning to those whose duty it is to exe-
cute it, either ministerially or judicially, it is necessarily in-
operative. The law must remain as it was, unless that which
professes to change it, be itself intelligible.' 22 However no
further use of this dictum was made until after the Civil War,
when the case is cited as authority for the court's statement
that " . . . a statute must be capable of construction and
interpretation; otherwise it will be inoperative and void. The
court must use every authorized means to ascertain and give
it an intelligible meaning; but if after such effort it is found
to be impossible t6 solve the doubt and dispel the obscurity,
if no judicial certainty can be settled upon as to the mean-
ing, the court is not at liberty to supply, to make one." 23
The doctrine was also receiving content in other states.
Indiana was one of the first clearly to consider the effect of
indefinite language in a statute. Indiana courts in a series of
decisions from 1856 to 186124 struggled with statutes con-
21. Fed. Cas. No. 16,264 at 1043 (C.C.D.Pa. 1815).
22. Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. 110, 115, 116 (1833). However, the court
immediately distinguished the rules of construction for private laws
from the rules applicable to public laws. As to the latter, the court
said it was informed of "The grievance, the old law, and the defect
in it . . . [which] furnish the means of discovering the intention
of the Legislature, notwithstanding a defective expression of it
.. But with private acts, it is entirely different.... No latitude
of construction is admissible .... " Ibid.
23. State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 553 (1884). The statute involved
referred to "Mount Zion church in Gaston county." Since there
were two such churches in that county, and since the testimony of
a senator as to which church was meant was held to be incompetent,
the court declared the statute void.
24. Hackney v. State, 8 Ind. 494 (1856) ; McJunkins v. State, 10 Ind.
140 (1858); Jennings v. State, 16 Ind. 335 (1861); cf. Marvin v.
State, 19 Ind. 181 (1862).
[Vol. 23
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taining such terms as "public indecency" and "nuisance."
While most of the language in those cases was dicta, and
soon repudiated,25 the practice thus began of looking closely
to determine whether statutes were sufficiently clear to give
adequate notice of the offense charged. The Indiana Con-
stitution itself has a "plain-wording" provision which has
been interpreted as requiring definiteness in statutory lan-
guage.26
The principle as it thus emerged from the pre-Civil War
era continued to develop as it was applied to a variety of
situations,27 particularly those involving new economic regula-
tions. A typical example of the use of the concept in the
economic field is a state decision, Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Commonwealth, holding that an action could not be main-
tained to recover penalties under a statute making an "unrea-
sonable" rate of fare unlawful.28
As economic interests resorted to the federal courts for
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against state
regulatory legislation, those courts too were faced with the
challenge of "vagueness."29 As a federal tool, the doctrine
seems to stem from a statement of Mr. Justice Brewer in the
Dey case that ". . . no penal law can be sustained unless its
mandates are so clearly expressed that any ordinary person
can determine in advance what he may and what he may not
do under it."' ' 0 The statement was relied on and expanded in
25. Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150 (1864); cf. State v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364(1867).
26. Ind. Const. Art. IV, §20: "Every act and joint resolution shall be
plainly worded, avoiding, as far as practicable, the use of technical
terms." Finding this requirement humorous is unavoidable, for the
provision gravely enjoins indefinitely worded statutes in terms of
utmost "indefiniteness."
27. For state cases dealing with the problem of vagueness during this
period, see 38 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 964 and n.4 (1925). For a list
of words subject to the attack of indefiniteness, see Aigler, op. cit.
supra n.6, at 847 et seq.
28. 99 Ky. 132, 35 S.W. 129 (1896).
29. One of the earliest lower federal court decisions concerned with
economic regulation was Louisville & N. R.R. v. R.R. Comm. of
Tenn., 19 Fed. 679 (C.C.M.D.Tenn. 1884). A state statute author-
izing the commission to fix rates so as to prevent the taking of
unjust and unreasonable compensation was held void as too indef-
inite. The court said that proof of unreasonableness would be ajury question, making defendant's guilt or innocence dependent on
the jury and not on the construction of the act.
30. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 876 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1888)
where section 23 of the Iowa Freight Rate Act was held to be
sufficiently definite to justify an equitable action thereunder.
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the Tozer case four years later.31 It should be emphasized
that at this time the concept was still primarily a principle
of construction and had not yet received the sanctity of being
associated with the constitutional requirement of due pro-
cess.32 But it seems a coincidence of some moment that the
device of invalidating a statute for vagueness should devel-
op on the federal level concurrently with the growth of the
tool of substantive due process.33
Brewer's dicta, while sitting on circuit,34 seemingly in-
fluenced the Supreme Court in following decisions.3 5 In
United States v. Brewer the same intimation as to the need
31. Tozer v. United States, 52 Fed. 917 (C.C.E.D.Mo. 1892). Brewer,
J., citing the Dey case, supra n.30, said, "But, in order to constitute
a crime, the act must be one which the party, is able to know in
advance whether it is criminal or not. The criminality of an act
cannot depend upon whether a jury may think it reasonable or
unreasonable. There must be some definiteness and certainty."
Tozer v. United States, supra at 919. A conviction under section 3
of the Interstate Commerce Act was reversed, the clause being too
indefinite.
32. It has been suggested that it is doubtful that "lack of meaning
should ever have been viewed as the equivalent of lack of constitu-
tionality . . . it seems a permissible conclusion that where the
legislature has failed to make itself understood, its unarticulated
commands cannot be enforced." Gellhorn, "Administrative Law,
Cases and Comments" 160 (2d ed. 1947). None of the texts of the
period discussed vagueness in term of unconstitutionality. See
Endlich, "Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes" 353
(1888); Sedgwick, "Statutory and Constitutional Law" (2d ed.
1874); Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" §140, esp. p.184
(1891).
33. The writer recognizes that the phrase "substantive due process"
may mean that doctrine by which the First Amendment is incor-
piorated into the Fourteenth Amendment in order to protect civil
liberties. This principle was not enunciated until the case of
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The phrase, "sub-
stantive due process" as used here, refers to the economic content
which was read into the Fourteenth Amendment by such cases as
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 418 (1890) and Reagan
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), and which
was denounced by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
34. Supra n. 30.
35. An earlier Supreme Court case had incidentally skirted the ques-
tion. The Civil Rights Act of 1870 was held inoperative because
too broadly worded and hence beyond Congressional power as con-
ferred by the Fifteenth Amendment. United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1876). Chief Justice Waite, in dictum, said, "Every
man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing
a crime." Id. at 220.
36. 139 U.S. 278 (1891). "Laws which create crimes ought to be so
explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts
it is their duty to avoid." Id. at 288. The Court cited as authority
for the quoted sentence the cases of United States v. Sharp, supra
p.275, and United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624 (1890). The latter
case upheld a conviction under an ambiguously drawn federal sta-
of definiteness for validity was stated. Eighteen years later
in the first Waters-Pierce case37 the Court faced the prob-
lem squarely for the first time. A corporation argued, inter
alia, that the Texas anti-trust laws deprived it of procedural
due process of law by being "so vague, indefinite, and un-
certain as to deprive them [the laws] of their constitutional-
ity."38 The Court sustained the state statute over this ob-
jection, and distinguished the Dey, Tozer and Louisville v.
Commonwealth decisions.39  No comment was made on the
quiet appearance of a new constitutional doctrine, i.e., that
an indefinite statute violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The breadth of the language in the
Dey case was explicitly limited, however, by Mr. Justice
Holmes in the case of Nash v. United States.40 He said that
the law is full of instances where a man's fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury sub-
sequently estimates it, some matter of degree."4' 1
The doctrine was officially received into the Supreme
Court's bosom five years later in another anti-trust case, In-
ternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.42 The Court there
invalidated three statutes which had been construed together
by the Kentucky court as prohibiting combinations fixing
tute. Chief Justice Fuller in a fully annotated passage outlined
the considerations which a court should entertain when faced with
an eliptical penal statute. "As contended on behalf of the de-
fendant, there can be no constructive offenses, and before a man
can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within
the statute. But though penal laws are to be construed strictly,
yet the intention of the Legislature must govern in the construction
of penal as well as other statutes, and they are not to be construed
so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the Legislature."
Id. at 628.
37. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
38. Id. at 108.
39. Supra n.30, n.31, n.28. The ground for the distinction was that in
those three cases the statutes which were invalidated made guilt
depend on a jury's finding, whereas the Texas statute did not give
such broad power. The distinction seems rather fine, but the Sher-
man Act had previously been sustained in Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), helping to pave the way for
state statutes.
40. 229 U.S. 373 (1913) where the Sherman Act, construed to prohibit
"undue" restraints of trade, was sustained against a charge of
vagueness.
41. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1912). The most recent
reiteration of this frequently quoted passage appears in Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in the Winters case.
42. 234 U.S. 216 (1914). Cf. companion case of Collins v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 634 (1914).
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prices other than at the "real value" of the article. Mr.
Justice Holmes distinguished his decision in the Nash case,43
saying that here the combination is forced "to guess at its
peril" as to an imaginary rather than an actual state of
facts.- He said that in the Nash case the statute had been
upheld because the combination was required only to esti-
mate as to a matter of degree.45
Once established, the primary use of the doctrine con-
tinued to lie in the field of economic regulation. An Idaho
statute regulating grazing of sheep on a "range" was sus-
tained as sufficiently definite." Yet part of the federal
price control statute of the first World War47 was invalidated
as too indefinite.4  The phrase "unreasonable price" was
held to forbid no specific criminal act.49 Similarly, a state
43. Supra n.40.
44. A commentator uses this distinction to classify the "vagueness"
cases into two types: the "Nash" line and the "International Har-
vester" line. See 38 Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1924). Cf. Miller v.
Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915) where the Court uses this distinction
and places its decision under the "Nash" line. Id. at 434.
45. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223, 224
(1914).
46. Omachevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). As to the contention
that the Idaho statute did not provide boundaries of a "range" the
Court said, "Men familiar with range conditions and desirous of
observing the law will have little difficulty in determining what is
prohibited by it." Id. at 348. Cf. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ind.
Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) where plaintiff contended that
the motion picture censorship statute violated his guaranteed right
of free speech under the Ohio Constitution, and constituted an
invalid delegation of power to an administrative board because it
furnished too general a standard. The Court, in sustaining the
statute, said ". . . its: terms, like other general terans, get precision
from the sense and experience of men . . . ." Id. at 245, 246.
Gellhorn, op. cit. supra n.32 at 160, suggests that the degree of
indefiniteness may be considerably greater in an administrative
statute which takes on content by agency action before the indi-
vidual is affected by it.
47. 41 Stat. 297 (1919). (Lever Act).
48. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). Cf.
companion case of Weeds v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921)
and see 19 Mich. L. Rev. 337 (1921). The battle is still raging
over price regulation and "vagueness." The word "cost" is the
primary object of attack. See Thatcher, "The Constitutionality of
the Unfair Practices Act," 30 Minn. L. Rev. 559 at 568-577 (1946).
Cf. 32 Iowa L. Rev. 125 (1946); Blum v. Engelman, 57 A.2d 421(Md. 1948) where injunctive provisions of the Maryland Unfair
Sales Act were upheld.
49. The distinction as to civil and criminal actions under the Lever
Act, supra n.47, was abolished when the "rule" of the Cohen Gro-
cery case, supra n.48, was extended to invalidate, as too vague, the
civil action aspect of the Lever Act. Small Co. v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
NOTES
"prevailing-wage" statute was held void for lack of suffi-
cient definiteness. 0 A state anti-trust statute was set aside
on the ground of vagueness, 51 but a state rent law was
upheld on the theory that any alleged indefiniteness went only
to the statute's criminal sanctions which were not in issue.52
However, a state highway statute was invalidated for indefi-
niteness, 53 as were penal provisions under a state statute re-
gulating petroleum production." A conviction for transport-
ing a stolen airplane under the National Motor Vehicle Theft
Act55 was set aside because the law did not give fair warning
that such conduct was prohibited.5 6 The most recent case in
the field of economic regulation was that arising from a chal-
lenge of the Lea Act57 as contravening the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment for want of certainty. The statute
was upheld because "wilfullness" was a required ingredient"8
of criminal violation. Mr. Justice Black said, "That there
may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine
the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls
is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to
define a criminal offense." 59
A parallel line of cases developing during the same
period illustrates the use of the doctrine of "void for vague-
ness" in the area of civil liberties. In Fox v. Washington,60
50. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S 385 (1926).
51. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
52. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922). For a criticism
of the grounds on which the Court reconciled this case with its
decision in the Small case, supra n.49, see 38 Harv. L. Rev. 863(1925).
53. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
54. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm. of Okla., 286 U.S.
210 (1932).
55. 41 Stat. 324, 18 U.S.C. §408 (1919).
56. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
57. 60 Stat. 89, 47 U.S.C. §506 (a) (1) (1946).
58. Consideration of the effect of the requirement of wilfullness as a
means of making a statutory standard more definite is beyond the
scope of this note. The problem has arisen with some frequency.
See Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510 (1916); Hygrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Omaechevarria
v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S.
513 (1942) (where Mr. Justice Black follows the "Nash" line of
reasoning, cf. supra n.44, and distinguishes the International Har-
vester and Cohen Grocery Co. cases) ; Gorin v. United States, 312
U.S. 19 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S, 91 (1945).
59. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947), 26 Tex. L. Rev.
216.
60. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
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Mr. Justice Holmes upheld a state statute making it a crime
to publish wilfully"' any printed matter tending to disrespect
for law. The state court had construed the statute to mean
an actual breach of the law, thereby removing the element of
too great indefiniteness.62 Similarly, a criminal syndicalism
statute was upheld as containing a sufficient definition of the
activities proscribed,63 and an indictment under the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act64 was sustained against the charge that
the phrase "political purpose" was too vague.6 5 However, the
Court struck down a conviction under an antique Georgia stat-
ute, relying in part on the ground that the statute as construed
by the Georgia court did not furnish a sufficiently ascertain-
able standard of guilt.6 6 Two years later another state stat-
ute was invalidated because the word "gang" was found to
be "so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at
its meaning.167  But a conviction under the Espionage Act
of 191768 was sustained, the Court finding the statute suf-
ficiently definite because "intent" was required.69 The Court
expressed three views as to the effect of the element of intent
in a federal statute7 0 which had been attacked as too vague
in the Screws case.71 Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief
Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed, remanded the case
because the trial court's charge to the jury did not define "wil-
fully" to mean "specific intent."'72 Mr. Justice Rutledge joined
as to disposal of the case, but both he and Mr. Justice Murphy
felt that the statute as applied to the case was clearly consti-
tutional. Mr. Justice Roberts, with whom Justices Frankfur-
ter and Jackson concurred, believed that the statute contained
no ascertainable standard of guilt. And now in the Winters
61. See supra n.58.
62. Contra: Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
64. 43 Stat. 1053, 18 U.S.C. §208 (1925).
65. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
66. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
67. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), 23 Minn L. Rev.
823. Cf. State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. (Sup. Ct.) 395, 22 A.2d
877 (1941) and see 42 Col. L. Rev. 857 (1942).
68. 40 Stat. 217, 50 U.S.C. §31 (1917).
69. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941). Cf. supra n.58.
70. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 60 Stat. 89, 47 U.S.C. §506
(Supp. 1946).
71. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
72. Cf. supra n.58.
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case the Court has invalidated a statute regulating publica-
tions so massing accounts of violence as to incite to crime.
The Court felt that the statute established contours of crimi-
nality so hazy that it abridged the rights of free speech and
press, and failed to measure up to constitutional procedure.
Before assessing the soundness of the Winters decision,
it might be well to ask if any consistent principle emerges
from the cases enumerated above. Certain rough classifica-
tions do appear: (1) in the post-Civil War days before
definiteness became a constitutional requirement, "void for
vagueness" occasionally helped shape the Court's decisions,
but did not directly decide them, (2) after the doctrine
acquired a constitutional blessing with the International Har-
vester case73 its influence spread into the civil liberties field.
But no consistent distinction can be drawn between the effect
of vagueness in economic matters and the effect of vagueness
in areas sheltered by the Bill of Rights. Presence of one of
the following factors may affect the fate of a statute: the re-
quirement of "wilfulhiess" or "intent" in a criminal statute;
the use of words having a "common law" or "familiar" back-
ground; the content acquired through administrative regula-
tion under the statute; the state court construction of the
statute; the scope given the jury in determining whether a
violation of the statutory standard occurred; civil sanctions
as opposed to criminal penalties under the statute; or the
character of the statute as determined by the subject matter
on which it operates-all these distinctions appear.74
One's foremost impression is of the capriciousness with
which the doctrine of "void for vagueness" has been
argued by parties and used by courts. One writer, refer-
ring to the similarity between the doctrine and substantive
due process, has said that "Significantly, knowable criteria
in 'common experience' [a requirement frequently demanded
by the Court if a statute is to avoid the hazard of vague-
ness] have been found wanting in interpreting only those
statutes which sought to limit the free play of economic
forces."7 ; Although "vagueness" has expanded into the civil
liberties field, the implications of this statement seem still
73. Supra n.45.
74. See Aigler, op. cit. supra n.6; Freund, "Legislative Regulation"
c.8 (1932).
75. 45 Harv. L. Rev. 160 al 162, 163 (1931).
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to be true today. If the Court is indeed indulging in an
unconscious method curiously like that of "substantive due
process" it is deplorable. Mr. Justice Reed indicates that a
distinction exists for him as to statutes affecting free speech. 8
Mr. Justice Frankfurter intimates that he believes the ma-
jority in the Winters case were reading into the decision
their own predilections, psychological or social. 7
If this hypothesis is correct, then the use of the doctrine
of "void for vagueness" is subject to all the arguments
brought to bear against the once rampant tool of "substantive
due process." 78 Yet the problem is not an easy one, particu-
larly where, as here, potential infringements of rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment exist.7" It might be argued
strenuously that a statute making it a crime to utter words
creating a "clear and present danger"80 would be unconstitu-
tional. Its invalidity could be urged from the standpoint of
vagueness. However, could it not be as strongly argued that
the statute was invalid because it conflicted with the First
Amendment by restricting legitimate activity? It is likely
that the prohibition would dam up permissible free expression
simply because of the statute's enactment.,1
Another disagreeable aspect of a statute like that of New
76. Supra n.4 (1).
77. Winters v. New York, 68 S.Ct. 665, 679 (1948).
78. See Borchard, "The Supreme Court and Private Rights," 47 Yale
L. J. 1051 (1938).
79. Mr. Justice Reed sounds a well taken warning: "The present case
as to a vague statute abridging free speech involves the circulation
of only vulgar magazines. The next may call for decision as to
free expression of political views in the light of a statute intended
to punish subversive activities." Winters v. New York, 68 S.Ct.
665, 671 (1948).
80. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
81. There may be occasions, however, where it is desirable to limit
activity, even though legitimate, by the enactment of a statute
worded in "constitutional" terms. Cf. Price Municipal Corp. v.
Jaynes, 191 P.2d 606 (Utah 1948). An ordinance, in the language
of the Fourth Amendment, provided that the right of the people
of the City of Price to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures should not
be violated. A violation thereof was made a misdemeanor. Charac-
terizing the ordinance as a mere policy statement, the Utah Sup-
reme Court held it void for vagueness. However, perhaps it would
be desirable to sustain a statute of this type. True, it places a
burden on those acting under it, and those engaged with enforcing
it, to ascertain whether certain activity will constitute a violation.
But is it not precisely within this field that people should act at
their peril, since, in acting, they may violate the civil liberties of
others.
NoTEs
York is its conduciveness to only sporadic enforcement. 2 In
lying dormant the statute does not acquire a more definite
meaning, if this is a requisite. Moreover, persons who may
come under the statute's ban have no way of knowing when
the ax will fall-although the advent of a new political admin-
istration is frequently a warning signal. These objections do
not go primarily to any vagueness in the wording of the stat-
ute, qua statute, but to its enforcement by state authorities. It
is suggested that a sounder attitude, both from the viewpoint
of proper judicial activity, and from the viewpoint of social
desirability, would be to outlaw the amorphous constitutional
doctrine of "void for vagueness" as a judicial tool.82 Civil
rights can be protected by other, existing constitutional guar-
antees4 and judicial techniques,85 and cases will be decided
squarely on their merits. G The use of federal legislative
history" gives content to, and indicates the purpose of, most
federal statutes which lack clarity. However, the legislative
history of a state statute is frequently inaccessible. Con-
struction, by the state court, of the statute should be done
in the traditional manner of looking to the over-all "legislative
intent." Should the statute as construed be challenged in
the United States Supreme Court, the Court should determine
the case on its merits in relation to established constitutional
guarantees, rather than evade the constitutional issues on the
ground of "vagueness."
82. Cf. Winters v. New York, 68 S.Ct. 665, 673 (1948).
83. The distinction between a completely meaningless statute and one
which is "vague" or ambiguous should again be emphasized. Cf.
supra n.32. The recent case of United States v. Evans, 68 S.Ct.
634 (1948) illustrates the refusal of the Court to enforce a stat-
ute because meaningless. The Court did not feel obligated to
refer to any particular constitutional provision, but withheld en-
forcement solely because it could not ascertain Congress' intention,
even though it closely examined the legislative history of the
statute. The statute defined more than one offense, but pro-
vided a penalty for only one of the named offenses. An indictment
brought under the section was accordingly dismissed because the
Court said it would have to "legislate" in order to provide a penalty
for the offenses charged, and this was not a judicial function. It
would seem that the defect of this statute was its too great spe-
cificity, although it is of the type which some courts might term
too "vague."
84. E.g., the First Amendment. Cf. supra n.33.
85. E.g., the doctrine of strict construction of penal statutes.
86. Cf. Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
87. See Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,"
47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 543 (1947).
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